Lessons from Israeli Battlefield Air Interdiction During the Battle for Golan, October 1973

This study establishes lessons, and draws conclusions from Israeli Air Force air-to-surface operations during the battle for Golan in October, 1973. The Israeli air mission and principal operational factors are identified and described. A historical analysis then considers how the principal factors influenced Israeli fighter operations, and determines what results were achieved. The study shows that Israeli air-to-surface operations during the battle were equivalent to current US Air Force doctrine for Battlefield Air Interdiction. Enemy ground forces and their objectives, Israeli assets, threats to fighter operations, and environmental conditions are described and analyzed to establish how they influenced operations. The results of operations are then measured against the doctrinal goals of Battlefield Air Interdiction to determine Israeli success. The study concludes that Israeli air operations effectively contributed to the defeat of enemy ground forces, but the delayed nature of the effects produced important risks to the outcome of the battle. Further, the principle factors had a significant and mixed influence on the results of air operations.